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ANTHONY BIONDO†
INTRODUCTION
Attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest privileges for
confidential communications,1 needs to adapt to the modern
world. The privilege plays an important role in the legal system
by preventing attorneys from being compelled to divulge
confidential communications between themselves and their
clients. This assurance of confidentiality encourages clients to be
fully open, which is essential to a well-functioning attorney-client
relationship.2 However, clients may find that communication is
unprivileged because they communicated with their attorney
through a system operated and monitored by their employer.
Many employers now provide employees with technology
systems—such as computers and email systems—and many
employers monitor the communications made through these
systems.3 Since privilege will not attach to a communication that
is revealed to a third party,4 some courts have held that when an
employee uses a monitored email system to communicate with

†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2016, St. John’s University School of
Law; B.S., 2013, Computer Science, Stony Brook University.
1
4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 3193–94 (1904).
2
4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 3196.
3
In a 2007 survey of employers, it was found that 43% of companies surveyed
monitored employee email, and of those, 40% assigned an individual to manually
read and review email while 73% used technology tools to automatically monitor
email.
2007
Electronic
Monitoring
&
Surveillance
Survey,
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE EPOLICY INSTITUTE,
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillance
Survey.pdf [hereinafter ePolicy Survey].
4
4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 3185.
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his attorney, the communication is unprivileged.5 This Note
focuses on email, as it is a common method of electronic
communication that is often facilitated by employer-controlled
systems.6
New technology and new methods of communication have
created issues in the application of attorney-client privilege.7 In
particular, the fact that email systems are often facilitated and
monitored by a third party,8 often an employer,9 creates
uncertainty in the application of the confidentiality element of
attorney-client privilege.10 Further compounding the issue are
employer policies that prohibit personal use or allow for broad
monitoring of employer systems, which are often buried away
deep in an employee handbook, and employees may not realize
that such a policy exists or fully understand the ramifications of
the policy on the confidentiality of their communications.11 This
false sense of security can lead to an inadvertent loss of privilege
by a client.12
In considering whether an employer has the ability to access
an electronic communication, courts are attempting to look
beyond the transaction as experienced by the users, and probe
5
See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL
2998671, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employer’s policy of prohibiting
any personal use of company-issued computers removed any possible expectation of
privacy and that communication was unprivileged since employee used a private
email account to communicate with attorney on a company-issued computer).
6
See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3.
7
JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS, CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 2.08 (1999) (“[M]any important issues currently at
the center of the privilege discussion concern new technology.”).
8
See infra Section III.B.
9
See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3.
10
SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, § 2.08 (“Using new technology can raise
concerns about whether purportedly privileged communications were actually made
in confidence, or whether the use of certain technologies effectuates a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.”).
11
See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3 (“Unfortunately, the methods employers use
to alert employees to e-mail and Internet monitoring are not necessarily the most
effective: 70% of organizations in 2007 relied on an employee handbook to inform
users about computer monitoring.”). Additionally, employees may be mistaken in
thinking that the employer’s policy does not cover their actions. See, e.g., Long v.
Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employees lost privilege by using a company-issued
computer to access a password protected private email account).
12
See, e.g., Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1107 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) (holding that an employee lost privilege despite claim that he never
received or read the employee handbook).

FINAL_BIONDO

2016]

10/25/2016 8:55 AM

EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE EMAIL

443

into the path of the message as it flows through the Internet.13
However, employers are only one of a number of parties that
facilitate electronic communications with the technical ability
and limited legal right to intercept and monitor them.14 Though
an employer may have a comparatively broad right to monitor
the emails flowing through its systems, they are not the only
party with a qualified right to do so.15 This Note argues that
courts should focus on the communication as experienced by the
user/client. The policy of encouraging free and open discourse
and candor favors protecting the client’s reasonable expectations.
Since electronic communication on the Internet is often
facilitated by numerous third parties, it is unreasonable to expect
a client to consider the monitoring ability of each third party
when communicating with his attorney electronically.
In confronting the issue of whether an employer-monitored
electronic communication is privileged, courts will divide the
confidentiality problem into a two-step inquiry: (1) Was there a
subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the
client/employee, and (2) Was that subjective expectation of
privacy objectively reasonable?16 As to the first question, clients
who did not subjectively believe that their communications would
be confidential are not entitled to the protection of attorney-client
privilege, because there was no need of an assurance of
confidentiality to encourage them to make the communication.17
13

See discussion infra Part II (discussing different approaches taken by courts
in approaching the issue); Section III.B (discussing the issue of perspectives in the
legal analysis of internet activities).
14
See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the rights of Internet Service
Providers and Internet Mailbox Providers to access communications facilitated
through their systems).
15
See discussion infra Section III.A. New York, for example, has a statute
preventing an electronic communication from losing its privileged character because
a third-party facilitator may have access to it. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4548 (McKinney
2016). However, at least one court has held this statute inapplicable to employer
monitoring. Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007) (discussed infra).
16
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A]ll claims of
privilege arising out of the attorney-client relationship . . . require[] a showing that
the communication in question was given in confidence and that the client
reasonably understood it to be so given.”).
17
4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 3234 (“One of the circumstances, by
which it is commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential, is the
presence of a third person . . . . [E]ven if we might predicate a desire for confidence by
the client, the policy of the privilege would still not protect him, because it goes no
further than is necessary to secure the client’s subjective freedom of
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As to the second question, however, courts diverge and conflict
arises.18
Some courts formalistically conclude that if the
employer has the right to monitor the use of its systems, the
expectation of privacy is so eroded as to be objectively
unreasonable, and refuse to apply privilege.19 Though the brightline nature of this rule seemingly provides certainty, the rule
may actually inject more uncertainty into the analysis by forcing
clients to consider the rights of numerous third parties
facilitating an electronic communication.20 Other courts have
adopted one of several factor tests, such as the “oft-quoted”21 fourfactor test from the case In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.22 These
tests provide a case-by-case analysis in order to prevent
communications from inequitably being unprivileged,23 but the
factors are not sufficiently tied to the reality of communication on
the Internet or to a user’s reasonable perspective of Internet
email communication.24
This Note argues for the use of an objective element that
focuses on the experience from the perspective of the user. The
subjective element of the analysis remains unchanged, but a
court will be asked to consider whether the client’s subjective
belief was objectively reasonable from their perspective as a user
consultation . . . .”); see also United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 737
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As a general rule, the voluntary production of a privileged
document waives any claim of privilege with respect to that document.”).
18
Indeed, when analyzing the particular, many courts take for granted that the
employee subjectively believed that his communication would be private. See, e.g., In
re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Court
assumes that the Insider E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the
Insiders subjectively intended that they be confidential.”).
19
See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL
2998671, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employees had no reasonable
expectation of privacy when employer policy stated that employees “have no right of
personal privacy” when using employer systems); Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (finding
no expectation of privacy where employer acknowledged that it did not monitor
employee email but retained the right to do so).
20
See infra Section III.B.
21
Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., LLC, 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935 (N.D.
Ill. 2012).
22
322 B.R. at 257.
23
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“[T]he recognition
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a
case-by-case basis.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059)).
24
See id. at 393 (“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain
but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.”).

FINAL_BIONDO

2016]

10/25/2016 8:55 AM

EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE EMAIL

445

of the Internet. This test avoids the issue of requiring clients to
consider the path their electronic communication takes through
the Internet by focusing on their perspective as a user of the
Internet. Given the seemingly private nature of email, this
analysis starts with a strong presumption that an email message
is privileged. Next, for each party that has a right to access the
email message as it flows through the Internet, the court
considers the relationship as between the client and the party
with access from the client’s perspective as an Internet user. The
court asks what the nature of this relationship is, how
foreseeable it is that the communication may be of interest to
this party, and whether the party regularly exercises its right to
monitor the email such that the client should expect that the
message would be monitored. This approach has the effect of
limiting the analysis to the perspective of the user, who is
entirely unaware of some parties—like operators of routers on
the Internet—and well aware of others—like an employer or
email provider—for transparent parties, monitoring is entirely
unforeseeable and thus privilege is not affected.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of the attorney-client privilege with a focus on the
history and policy behind the confidentiality requirement. Part
II explores the differing approaches, and their respective
applications, currently used by courts to determine when
privilege attaches to an attorney-client communication
transmitted through or using an employer’s systems. Part III
provides a background of the relevant technology and discuss the
different viewpoints courts can take when analyzing an electronic
communication. Part IV proposes a new objective analysis of the
reasonableness of a client’s subjective belief of privacy that
focuses on the communication from the perspective of the user,
rather than the perspective of an outsider viewing the Internet
as a series of physical connections.
I.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Professor John Henry Wigmore explained the concept of
attorney-client privilege in his well-known treatise Evidence in
Trials at Common Law:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relevant to that purpose, (4) made in
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confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the client waives the protection.25

This Part examines the privilege by dividing these elements
into three components. The first component defines the subject
matter covered by the privilege, legal advice sought from a
professional legal advisor. The second component defines the
type of material covered, communications between a client and
an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. The third
component covers how an act, inconsistent with the intent for a
communication to be or remain confidential, affects privilege.
A.

Component One: Legal Advice Is Sought from a Professional
Legal Advisor in His or Her Capacity as Such

The first component is that legal advice is sought from a
professional legal advisor in his or her capacity as such. This
component defines the scope of the subject matter to which
privilege may be applied.26 It is the intent of the client that
controls.27 The client must intend to obtain legal advice or
assistance in order for privilege to attach.28 The privilege,
however, is quite broad; notably, there is no limitation that either
litigation or a specific dispute be contemplated or underway at
the time of the consultation.29

25
4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 3204. This formulation has received
substantial deference in the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437,
1441 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering the Wigmore formulation); see also, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(providing only four elements); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 853–55 n.1 (1998)
(collecting statutes).
26
4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2294–2304, at 3206–23.
27
1 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 7:1 (2015)
[hereinafter PRIVILEGE].
28
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The
key . . . is the intent of the client and whether he reasonably understood the
conference to be confidential.”); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that attorney hired by a counterfeiter to purchase printing equipment
for him “was acting as a business agent rather than a legal adviser” such that
privilege could not attach).
29
PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, § 7:1; see, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 n.8
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the “prepared in anticipation of litigation” standard
applicable to attorney work product protection was not necessary in order for
attorney-client privilege to attach).
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This demonstrates the primary modern justification for the
attorney-client privilege, which is to free the client from
apprehension and encourage full and frank disclosure when the
client seeks legal advice from his attorney.30 It stems from a
recognition that in order for lawyers to give sound legal advice
and provide strong advocacy, the lawyer must be fully informed
by the client.31 However, any privilege enforced by the court is
an exception to the general rule that every person can be called
upon to give testimony upon all facts.32 This component helps to
balance the competing policy interest in the efficient
administration of justice against the policy of promoting client
candor.33 It helps to narrowly tailor the privilege to only protect
those disclosures that are “necessary to obtain informed legal
advice which might not have been made absent the privilege.”34
B.

Component Two: A Communication Has Been Made by the
Client Relating to the Purpose of Seeking Legal Advice

The second component is that the privilege covers a
communication made by the client relating to the purpose of
seeking legal advice. This component defines what type of
material is covered. It is only a communication between the
attorney and the client that is protected by the privilege.35 The
facts communicated are not covered by the privilege, only the
contents of the communication itself.36 Facts and information do

30
See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 3196–97; Upjohn Co. v. United
States., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”).
31
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully informed by the client.”).
32
See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 3185 (“[T]he principle of Privilege, as
an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony to all facts
inquired of in a court of justice . . . .”).
33
Id. § 2295, at 3211 (discussing the policy of the requirement).
34
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
35
See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395 (“The privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who
communicated with the attorney.”); PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 5:1 (“An
important but commonly misunderstood limitation of the privilege is that it does not
protect the information contained within communications to the attorney.”).
36
See, e.g., In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 943–44 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that the court was still able to compel employees to reveal their analyses of
certain costs as these were the underlying facts in the case, it did not matter that
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not become privileged simply because they have been
communicated by a client to his or her attorney.37 For example, if
a client has communicated with his attorney facts about a
particular event, he cannot be compelled to answer questions of
the form “what did you tell your attorney about the event,” but
could still be compelled to answer factual questions about the
event itself.38 Like the first component, this component also
helps to narrowly tailor the privilege. It protects the rights of the
adversary and the fact finder by allowing them to learn the facts
of the case, while promoting client candor by preventing
disclosure of communications made while seeking legal advice.39
C.

Component Three: The Communication Was Made in
Confidence and the Confidence of the Communication Has
Been Maintained

The third component is that the communication has been
made in confidence and that the confidence be maintained. This
component defines the effect of an action inconsistent with the
intent of a communication to be privileged. In order for privilege
to attach, the client must have reasonably intended for the
communication to be made in confidence.40 This is a two-part
analysis. First, the client must subjectively intend that the
communication with his attorney be confidential.41 Second, this
subjective intent must be objectively reasonable under the

they had performed an analysis of costs at the request of counsel and communicated
this analysis to counsel).
37
See id. at 944 (“[M]erely by asking witnesses to conduct an analysis defense
counsel may not thereby silence all the key witnesses on the cost aspects of the
[subject] contracts under [a] claim of privilege.”).
38
See PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 5:1.
39
See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (“However, since the privilege has the effect
of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where
necessary to achieve its purpose.”).
40
See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A]ll
claims of privilege arising out of the attorney-client relationship . . . require[] a
showing that the communication in question was given in confidence and that the
client reasonably understood it to be so given.”).
41
PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 6:1 (“The client must intend his
communications with his attorney to be confidential.”).
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circumstances.42
Finally, this confidence must then be
maintained in order for the communication to remain privileged;
otherwise, privilege is waived.43
The argument for the confidentiality requirement is based in
policy. In seeking to protect only those disclosures that are
“necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have
been made absent the privilege,”44 if the client is willing to make
a disclosure in the presence of a third party, then the client does
not need the encouragement of privilege protection in order to
make the disclosure.45 Professor John Henry Wigmore views
confidentiality as an essential component of the relationship
between the two parties—it makes the communication worth
protecting because a legal assurance of nondisclosure cannot aid
a relationship where confidentiality is neither present nor
expected.46 If confidentiality is not essential to the relationship,
he argues, then any assurances of confidentiality through the
application of privilege do not sufficiently aid the relationship—
and, conversely, the lack of a privilege does not harm it—and the
costs of providing such protection outweigh the benefits.47
This logic is not without criticism.48 Professor Paul R. Rice
argues that this argument “equates secrecy with safety.”49 Rice
defines “safety” as the risk that a communication will be used
against the client, whereas secrecy is the risk that it will simply
be disclosed to a third party.50 Rice argues that the exclusionary
effect of the privilege is what is fundamental to the candor and to
the preservation of the relationship, and not any assurance of
42
Id. (“The client’s subjective intention of confidentiality must be reasonable
under the circumstances.”).
43
Id. (“[T]he confidentiality must have been subsequently maintained.”).
44
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
45
See, e.g., 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 3233 (citation omitted) (“The
reason for prohibiting disclosure ceases when the client does not appear to have been
desirous of secrecy.”).
46
Id. § 2285, at 3185 (“This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.”).
47
Id. (“The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.”).
48
See Rice, supra note 25, at 859 (arguing that the confidentiality requirement
should be abolished in its entirety).
49
Id. at 859–60 (“[I]t assumes that a client who is not concerned with public
embarrassment is also unconcerned about being legally compromised by the use of
these communications.”).
50
Id.
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absolute secrecy of the communications.51 Secrecy is within the
control of the client, since the attorney has a professional
responsibility to maintain secrecy and it is within the client’s
power to insist upon secrecy.52 Rice argues that requiring
secrecy, which the client can already insist upon if it is indeed
essential to the relationship, does not further the relationship,
and that the costs of maintaining the confidentiality requirement
outweigh the speculative benefits of narrowly tailoring the
privilege.53
Since rigid adherence to the requirement of confidentiality
may result in inequities, for example, when the parties are
unaware of a third party monitoring their communication, some
courts have begun to look at the issue through waiver doctrine.54
This analysis is focused on the voluntary acts of the client that
are inconsistent with the existence of a privilege.55 It views the
waiver—or failure of privilege to attach—as the product of a
“voluntary relinquishment of the attorney-client privilege.”56
This view of the confidentiality requirement has the effect of
introducing exceptions to the rule, such as the inadvertent
disclosure exception.57 The inadvertent disclosure exception,
formally recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence,58 protects
clients from inadvertent waiver when they have involuntarily or

51

Id. at 860.
Id. (“While secrecy often may be desired by the client, it is ensured, in part,
through the attorney by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and otherwise
within the factual control of the client.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client . . . .”).
53
Rice, supra note 25, at 860–61.
54
Id. at 881 (“Some courts began applying the standard for waiver . . . .”);
United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he person invoking the
privilege must have taken steps to ensure that it was not waived . . . .”).
55
SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, at § 2.06 (“Courts have categorized the
various acts and events that will create a waiver as voluntary or express and as
unintentional or implied. . . . [Thus, courts] consider waiver in terms of the act that
led to the disclosure.”).
56
Rice, supra note 25, at 881 n.76 (quoting State v. Beaupre, 459 A.2d 233, 236
(N.H. 1983)); see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 788 (3d Cir. 1985)
(requiring waiver of attorney-client privilege to be knowing).
57
Rice, supra note 25, at 881 (“As courts moved away from requiring
confidentiality as an absolute prerequisite for the existence of the privilege . . . a
number of new waiver concepts emerged.”).
58
FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(1).
52
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mistakenly revealed the communication.59 With new electronic
communications that are often facilitated and transparently
monitored by third parties, inadvertent disclosure of a
communication is more likely than ever. Given complex nature
of the Internet as a system of ferrying messages via multiple
third-party computer systems, true confidentiality is rarely, if
ever, assured.60 If uncertainty in the true confidentiality of an
email is allowed to translate into uncertainty in the application
of a privilege, the privilege will be ineffective in encouraging the
candor required to protect the attorney-client relationship.
Principles of waiver, a concern for safety over absolute privacy,
and taking the perspective of a user rather than of an external
viewer will help inject a much-needed element of certainty into
the privilege as applied in complicated environments such as the
Internet.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TAKEN BY COURTS
Currently, courts take two different approaches when
confronted with an issue involving an employee communicating
with his attorney through an employer system.61 Once the other
elements of attorney-client privilege have been met, and it has
been shown that there was a subjective belief on the part of the
client that the communication was private, the narrow question
becomes the objective reasonableness of the client’s subjective
belief.62 This is where the two approaches diverge. Section II.A
addresses the use of factor tests, particularly the oft-quoted fourfactor test from In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.63 Section II.B

59
Rule 502(b) provides for protection from waiver when: “(1) the disclosure is
inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 502(b). However, courts have treated “mistakenly, albeit
voluntarily, made” disclosures inconsistently. PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 9:72.
60
See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
61
Compare In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005) (providing a four-factor test), with Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847
N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (focusing on confidentiality).
62
See, e.g., In Re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 255 (emphasis omitted)
(“Confidentiality has both a subjective and objective component; the communication
must be given in confidence, and the client must reasonably understand it to be so
given.” (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989))).
63
322 B.R. at 257.
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addresses the use of a more formalistic approach in which courts
still consider various factors but place a strong emphasis on
actual confidentiality.
A.

Four-Factor Test

Courts considering the issue commonly cite the four-factor
test from In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.64 In that case, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York addressed the issue when a debtor vacated its offices and
left allegedly privileged emails behind on the debtor’s servers.65
The Trustee began an investigation involving the officers of the
debtor who had sent the emails, and served a subpoena duces
tecum on the officers seeking the production of the emails.66 The
debtor asserted privilege, which the debtors opposed because the
messages were not communicated confidentially due to the use of
a corporate email system.67 Based on right-to-privacy in the
workplace cases under the Fourth Amendment, the court
identified four factors that should be considered in determining
whether a belief in privacy was objectively reasonable:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or
other objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of
the employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a
right of access to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the
corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of
the use and monitoring policies?68

The court then noted that the employer “clearly had access to its
own servers” where the emails were stored, that it had a policy of
banning personal use of the email system, and that it notified
employees of this policy.69 However, the court was equivocal as to
whether or not the employer had a policy of actually monitoring
email and refused to conclude that privilege had been waived as
a matter of law.70

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252–53.
Id.
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260–61.
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Many courts have since looked to these factors for
“advisory”71 guidance on how to determine the objective
reasonableness of a client’s expectation of confidentiality.72 In
United States v. Hatfield, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York considered the factors when a
criminal defendant asserted privilege for several documents that
were otherwise privileged but had been stored on the hard drive
of an employer-provided computer.73
As to the first factor—the existence of a computer use
policy—the court noted that the employer’s policy did not
explicitly prohibit personal usage, though it did explicitly
prohibit some behavior, such as sexual harassment, installing
pirated software, and sending junk mail.74 The court thus
reasoned that this silence favored privilege.75 As to the second
factor—a monitoring policy—the court noted that the employer’s
policy allowed for the right to monitor, but that it did not
explicitly say that the company would monitor employee system
use; this, too, tipped in favor of applying privilege.76 As to the
third factor—a right of access—the court once again noted that
the employer had reserved a right of access and that this factor
tipped in favor of nonprivilege.77 As to the fourth factor—proper
notice of the monitoring policy—the court noted that the
defendant had notice of the policy and that this factor tipped in
favor of privilege.78
As a tiebreaker,79 the court added a fifth factor: how the
employer interpreted its own computer usage policy.80 The court
pointed to evidence that “unambiguously shows that [the
employer] believed that employees did not forfeit applicable
71
See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 WL
619572, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (“[T]he test is only advisory.”); United States
v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13,
2009) (“[T]he [c]ourt construes [the test] as being strictly advisory.”).
72
See, e.g., Finazzo, 2013 WL 619572, at *7; Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, Civil
Action No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5–6 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011);
Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 n.13; Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847
N.Y.S.2d 436, 441–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
73
Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *1.
74
Id. at *9.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *10 (noting that this fifth factor was “ultimately [the] deciding factor”).
80
Id.
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privileges by maintaining personal legal documents on their
company computers.”81 Indeed, the employer’s own counsel
testified that he believed individual privilege was protected
under the policy.82 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the
government, in arguing in favor of nonprivilege, was trying to
impose an interpretation of the usage policy that was never
imagined by the employer itself.83 The court finally held that the
communication was privileged.84
Courts do not, in every case where they apply the four-factor
test, hold that privilege may be applied. In In re Royce Homes,
LP,85 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas reached the opposite conclusion after applying
the four-factor test.86 There, an employee used a computer owned
by the debtor to draft and send email messages, and the Trustee
appointed to administer the debtor’s estate sought production of
the messages to determine if the debtor made any transfers.87
Adopting the four-factor test,88 the court compelled disclosure of
the messages.89 The court noted that the employer had a policy
allowing for access and monitoring of employer systems and
prohibiting certain uses of employer systems, and that all
information on the systems belonged to the company and would
not be considered private.90 Finally, the court concluded that the
employee knew or should have known of this policy, and that he
offered no evidence to rebut the assumption that he did,
ultimately compelling disclosure of the documents.91
This test, however, appears to place an undue emphasis on
the draftsman’s art, as courts applying the test tend to focus on
the wording of the employer’s policy reserving the right to inspect
employee communications. All four of the Asia Global factors
focus on the employer’s policies,92 while only the fifth “tiebreaker
element” from Hatfield introduces an element far more likely to
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
449 B.R. 709 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 732.
See In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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be on an employee’s mind when considering the confidentiality of
a communication: how the policy is actually enforced by the
employer.93 In focusing on a policy that may or may not be
enforced, this test leads to inconsistent applications of the
privilege, harming the attorney-client relationship.
B.

Formalistic Approach: Focusing on Confidentiality-in-Fact

Some courts take a more formalistic approach to the issue.
These courts place an emphasis on confidentiality-in-fact,
reasoning that if the communication was available at the time of
communication to a third party—the employer—privilege cannot
attach.94 In Hatfield, the court noted that most courts, after
applying the four-factor test, have held that employees may still
assert privilege on a communication made using an employer
system.95 Some cases, such as Long v. Marubeni America Corp.96
and Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc.,97 purport to be
applying the four-factor test, but in reality seem to be taking a
more formalistic approach to the issue.98 These cases actually
place a substantial emphasis on actual confidentiality, or the lack
thereof, and thus may properly be categorized as applying a
formalistic test. These two cases will be considered in this
subpart.
In Long v. Marubeni America Corp.,99 the plaintiff asserted
privilege for several email messages sent through private
password protected third party mailbox accounts using
computers provided by his employer, the defendant.100 The
employer had obtained these messages through monitoring

93
See United States v. Hatfield, No 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009).
94
See, e.g., Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2007).
95
Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 (“[M]ost-but not all-courts have held that
employees do not waive privilege simply by maintaining documents on a company
computer system.”).
96
No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
97
847 N.Y.S.2d 436.
98
Compare Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 (noting that these both apply a
factor test), with Alex DeLisi, Note, Employer Monitoring of Employee Email:
Attorney-Client Privilege Should Attach to Communications That the Client Believed
Were Confidential, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3521, 3551 (2013) (categorizing both Long
and Scott as applying a formalistic test).
99
2006 WL 2998671.
100
Id. at *2.
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software installed on the computer.101
The court did not
reference the four-factor test explicitly, but did consider all four
factors, noting that use of the system for personal matters was
prohibited, that the employer’s policy said that employees have
no right of privacy on employer systems, that the employer had
the right to monitor the systems, and that the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the policy.102 The court, however, focused
on the principle of waiver: that the plaintiff knew of the policy
and continued anyway, and that the confidentiality of the
documents was in fact compromised as a result, and held that the
emails were not privileged.103
In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc.,104 a New York
trial court held that privilege did not attach when an employee
communicated with his attorney through his employer’s email
system.105 First, the court rejected the proposition that waiver
was prevented by New York C.P.L.R. 4548, which preserves
privilege when parties necessary for the facilitation of an
electronic communication have access to the communication.106
The court then turned to the four-factor test, and considered the
effect of the employee handbook on privilege.107 Rather than
holding that the expectation of privacy was unreasonable, the
court simply held that “the effect of [the policy] is to have the
employer looking over your shoulder each time you send an
email,” concluding that the communication was not made in
confidence and that the communications was not privileged.108
In focusing on actual confidentiality, these courts, while they
purport to be applying a factor test, are actually taking a far
more formalistic approach to this issue. The courts in these cases
are formalistically concluding that a lack of confidentiality
precludes the application of privilege. While this does inject an
element of certainty into the equation, it is easy to see how this

101

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
103
Id. (“The plaintiffs disregarded the admonishment voluntarily and, as a
consequence, have stripped from the e-mail messages referenced above the
confidential cloak with which they claim those communications were covered.”).
104
847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
105
Id. at 447.
106
Id. at 440.
107
Id. at 441.
108
Id. at 440.
102
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would result in some communications being unexpectedly
unprivileged, as it weighs heavily in favor of the communication
not being privileged.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND PERSPECTIVES
Section III.A provides a background of the legal protections
provided to protect email from interception and monitoring
through the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).109
Section III.B provides an overview of the different viewpoints one
could take when analyzing an electronic communication, along
with a background of the relevant technology.
A.

Legal Protections of Electronic Communications

The legal protections afforded to email are similar to those
afforded to other forms of communication. Both email providers
and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) are restricted in what
they can monitor by the ECPA.110 The ECPA consists of two
parts: The Wiretap Act,111 which governs the interception of
electronic communications, and the Stored Communications
Act,112 which governs unauthorized access to stored electronic
information.113 The actual scope of the ECPA in protecting email
is the subject of much debate beyond the scope of this Note.114
This subsection considers briefly the implications of the ECPA
and its exceptions on the following three parties: ISPs, Internet
mailbox providers, and employers providing mailboxes and
equipment.

109
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848.
110
Id.
111
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
112
Id. §§ 2701–2712.
113
See Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA.
L. REV. 461, 485 (2012).
114
See id. (discussing the debate about the scope of the ECPA and how it
impacts employer monitoring of employee communications); Miguel Helft & Claire
Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun by the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://nyti.ms/1HH6nw6; Rainey Reitman, Deep Dive: Updating the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 6, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/deep-dive-updating-electroniccommunications-privacy-act (arguing for a modification of the law to account for
modern technology).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recently addressed the rights of ISPs in Kirch v. Embarq
Management Co.115 In that case, customers filed an action
alleging interception under the ECPA when the defendant, their
ISP, authorized an online advertising company to conduct a test
for directing and targeting advertisements to users that involved
directing traffic through the advertising company’s servers.116
Since the definition of “interception” in the ECPA does not
include the contents of communication “acquired in the ordinary
course of business,” the court held that the ISP had not actually
intercepted any communications and therefore did not violate the
ECPA.117 Advertising, the court reasoned, was a legitimate
business purpose for collecting and analyzing the information.118
Next, we consider the rights of Internet mailbox providers.
Google’s privacy policy has been the subject of recent litigation,
including two conflicting decisions. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy
Policy Litigation,119 Magistrate Judge Grewal for the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California120
held that the definition of “interception” in the Wiretap Act
similarly did not include Google acting as a service provider
when it obtained and used the information “in the ordinary
course of its business.”121 The court broadly interpreted the
phrase “ordinary course of business” to include Google’s “core
targeted advertising” business.122
As to the Stored
Communications Act, the court said that the claim “borders on
frivolous,” and explained that the Act exempts conduct
authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service,” which Google clearly authorized its
own conduct.123
Additionally, in In re Google Inc. Gmail

115

702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1245–46.
117
Id. at 1251 (“Earthlink acquired the contents of electronic communications
but did so in the ordinary course of business.” (quoting Hall v. Earthlink Network,
Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005))).
118
Id.
119
No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
120
This is Google’s home district. See Google Locations, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/about/company/facts/locations (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
(listing Mountain View, CA as company headquarters).
121
2013 WL 6248499, at *10 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 2510(5)(a) (2012)).
122
Id. at *10–11 (citing Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1250).
123
Id. at *12 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 2701(c)(1) (2012)).
116
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Litigation,124 the court narrowly interpreted the same phrase in
the Wiretap Act—the “ordinary course of business”—to only
include interception that was an “instrumental component of
Google’s operation of a functioning email system.”125 The court
did not address the Stored Communications Act.126
Finally, we consider the rights of employers in monitoring
employer-operated systems. In ECPA cases involving employers
monitoring employee email, courts have applied the same
exceptions as to other providers and have tended to permit broad
monitoring. In Freedom Calls Foundation v. Bukstel,127 the
plaintiff employer monitored and used the email account of the
ex-employee defendant—[defendant]@freedomcalls.org—who had
left the company, founded an identically named organization and
created
himself
a
similar
email
address—
[defendant]@freedomcalls.us.128
In the ensuing trademark
dispute, the defendant counterclaimed based on the ECPA that
his former employer had no right to access the emails still stored
in his old mailbox or to continue monitoring it for new emails
mistakenly sent to the incorrect address.129 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the
provider exceptions in both the Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act applied to protect the plaintiff from these
claims.130 Since the plaintiff provided the defendant with the
communication service, the court reasoned, they had the right to
search those stored emails as the need arose.131 As to the
Wiretap Act, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not
intercepting the emails as it received them in the normal course
of business and was using them to handle client matters in a
timely fashion.132

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
Id. at *8.
Id.
No. 05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *27.
Id.
Id. (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.

2003)).
132

Id.
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Similarly, in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,133
the plaintiff sued his ex-employer for damages under the ECPA
after the defendant employer searched his mailbox on its central
server for emails indicating his disloyalty, found such emails, and
terminated Plaintiff’s employment.134 As to the Wiretap Act, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the employer did not “intercept” his communications because it
obtained the emails at an earlier time and accessed them once
they were already stored.135 An intercept, the court reasoned,
had to be contemporaneous with transmission.136 As to the
Stored Communications Act, just like in Freedom Calls
Foundation, the court reasoned that the act of accessing email
authorized by the service provider was excepted from the act, and
that the employer as a service provider could do as it wished.137
Clearly, the ECPA provides protection that is uncertain at
best to employees, email users, and Internet users generally. It
can be said that these service providers all have a sort of
qualified permission to monitor Internet traffic and emails for
business purposes. An employer-employee relationship is a
special case, but an employer’s rights to inspect email are still
limited in much the same way as that of any other service
provider.
B.

Perspectives and Technical Background

When analyzing a legal problem on the Internet, the outcome
often depends on whether the problem is analyzed from the
“internal” perspective of a user on the Internet or from the
“external” perspective of the Internet as a set of physical links
between various systems spread throughout the globe.138 To the
internal observer, an email is “the equivalent of old-fashioned
postal mail,” a user simply drops the message in the mailbox of

133

352 F.3d 107.
Id. at 110–11.
135
Id. at 113–14.
136
Id. (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2003);
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1994)).
137
Id. at 114–15.
138
See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J.
357, 357 (2003) (“The Internet’s facts depend on whether we look to physical reality
or virtual reality for guidance.”).
134
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the recipient.139 To the external observer, this is a far more
complicated process involving the transmission of a message
between several third parties to get it to its destination.140 One
can look at the situation in more and more abstract ways,
ranging from “0s and 1s” to the simple postal mail analogy.141
Depending on how abstract a viewpoint one adopts, the question
of whether a communication is confidential may be answered
differently.
For example, a phone conversation, as an objective matter,
cannot be guaranteed to be private because it is routed through
wires operated by the phone company—a third party.142 Courts
are willing to extend privilege to phone conversations, however,
because of the legal protections afforded to them.143 This is
taking a more internal perspective—the view of a party on the
phone as having a private conversation with another, albeit
facilitated by a third party. The legal protections afforded to
modern Internet communications are not as strong.144
In
deciding problems of privilege based on what parties have access
to a communication, courts are choosing a perspective whether or
not they actually recognize that they are doing so.145 If a court
holds that employer monitoring of a system destroys any
possibility of privilege, it is implicitly taking an external
perspective to the issue. A problem arises when a court takes an
external perspective as to some aspects, such as employer
monitoring, but ignores other aspects, such as the facilitation of
the communications through other third parties such as ISPs.
139

Id. at 365.
Id. at 365–66.
141
Id. at 361–62 (“This does not necessarily mean that the Internet must be
viewed only as 0s and 1s . . . . [W]e look for analogies between realspace and the
behind-the-scenes action that computers connected to the Internet process and
complete.”).
142
See David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilege in High-Tech Communications,
60 TEX. B.J. 104, 107 (1997) (“[A]s an objective matter, there is no guarantee that
land-based phone conversations cannot be overheard, misdirected, or intercepted,
whether lawfully or not.”).
143
See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012) (prohibiting the use of unlawfully intercepted
communications as evidence in most situations, including in state and federal court);
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2012) (creating a civil damage remedy for unlawfully
intercepted communications); SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, at § 2.08 (“Traditional
landline telephone conversations are generally treated as confidential.”).
144
See supra Section III.A.
145
Kerr, supra note 138, at 381 (“Courts already choose perspectives when they
apply law to the Internet. They just [do not] realize it.”).
140
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An explanation of the technical background illustrates the
issue. Information transmitted through the Internet is broken
up into small “packets” of information,146 each of which is
independently routed147 through a number of routers148 and then
reconstructed149 at the other end—multiple copies of parts of a
message may exist in different places at the same time.150 Since
each packet of data is considered independently, the packets that
make up an email are not even guaranteed to take the same path
through the Internet to their destination.151 The routing of
Internet traffic is even subject to—likely illegal—manipulation
from elsewhere in the world.152 Indeed, the actual transmission
of the packet between routers may be protected under wiretap
statutes, but the routers in between, which copy and relay the
data to the next router, operated by ISPs create a privacy
hazard.153 ISPs can and do intercept, monitor, and even modify
traffic for a variety of reasons, such as injecting

146
JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN
APPROACH 56 (5th ed. 2010) (“In modern computer networks, the source breaks long
messages into smaller chunks of data known as packets.”); see also INFO. SCIS. INST.,
INTERNET PROTOCOL 1 (Jon Postel ed., 1981), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc791.pdf
[hereinafter RFC 791].
147
See RFC 791, supra note 146, at 2 (“The internet protocol treats each
internet datagram as an independent entity unrelated to any other internet
datagram.”).
148
KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 146, at 59 (“When a packet arrives at a router in
the network, the router examines a portion of the packet’s destination address and
forwards the packet to an adjacent router.”); see RFC 791, supra note 146, at 7 (“This
is done by passing the datagrams from one internet module to another until the
destination is reached.”).
149
KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 146, at 56; see generally INFO. SCIS. INST.,
TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL (Jon Postel ed., 1981), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/
rfc793.pdf [hereinafter RFC 793].
150
Hricik, supra note 142, at 113 (“[M]ultiple copies can exist at any given
time . . . .”).
151
RFC 791, supra note 146, at 2.
152
Such a situation has recently occurred. In what may best be described as a
heist, a hacker at a Canadian ISP recently managed to redirect “an entire chunk of
raw internet traffic from more than a dozen internet service providers” through its
servers, sifting through the data to intercept bitcoins, an electronic currency. See
Andy Greenberg, Hacker Redirects Traffic from 19 Internet Providers To Steal
Bitcoins, WIRED (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/isp-bitcointheft.
153
See, e.g., Test Your ISP, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/test
yourisp (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).
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advertisements,154 detecting and inhibiting the use of peer-topeer file sharing software,155 or sifting through the content of
communications to detect copyrighted material.156
This process applies to every communication on the Internet,
and email is built atop this system. An email message is not sent
directly from one computer to another, but is ferried as packets
from the sender’s computer to their mail provider, which
transmits it to the recipient’s mail provider, where it is stored in
a mailbox awaiting retrieval by the recipient.157 Copies of the
message likely remain in mailboxes stored on servers controlled
by both the sender and the recipient’s mail provider.158 The
copies of these messages are often further monitored and
analyzed by one’s email provider, be it a commercial provider like
Google, Microsoft, or the user’s employer.159
For example, Google, one of the world’s most popular email
providers,160 has “automated systems [that] analyze [the user’s]
content (including emails) to provide [the user] personally
relevant product features, such as . . . tailored advertising.”161
Google also will share personal information with outside entities
154

See, e.g., Nate Anderson, How a Banner Ad for H&R Block Appeared on
apple.com—Without Apple’s OK, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:30 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/how-a-banner-ad-for-hs-ok
(describing
ISP injection of advertisements).
155
Milton L. Mueller & Hadi Asghari, Deep Packet Inspection and Bandwidth
Management: Battles over BitTorrent in Canada and the United States, 36
TELECOMMS. POL’Y 462, 462 (2012) (discussing the throttling of data used by
BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file sharing program).
156
David Kravets, ISPs Now Monitoring for Copyright Infringement, WIRED
(Feb. 25, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/02/copyright-scofflaws-beware.
157
See
Marshall
Brain
&
Tim
Crosby,
How
E-mail
Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/e-mail-messaging/email
3.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2016); see also JONATHAN B. POSTEL, SIMPLE MAIL
TRANSFER PROTOCOL 1–2 (1982), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc821.pdf.
158
See Brain & Crosby, supra note 157. The messages are stored in “remote
message folders.” See M. CRISPIN, INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL VERSION –
4REV1 (2003), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3501.pdf (“[This protocol] permits
manipulation of mailboxes (remote message folders) . . . .”).
159
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
privacy (last updated June 28, 2016).
160
As of May 2015, Google reported that Gmail had 900 million users. Kelly
Sheridan, Google I/O: Gmail Hits 900M Users, Android Reaches a Billion,
INFORMATIONWEEK (May 28, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
software/enterprise-applications/google-i-o-gmail-hits-900m-users-android-reachesa-billion/d/d-id/1320612.
161
Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms (last
updated April 14, 2014).
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for a number of reasons, such as to “enforce applicable Terms of
Service, including investigation of potential violations[;] [to]
detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or technical
issues[;] [and to] protect against harm to the rights, property or
safety of Google, [its] users or the public as required or permitted
by law.”162 In a recent incident, Microsoft, apparently acting
under the terms of its own privacy policy,163 accessed the mailbox
of a Hotmail subscriber as part of an internal investigation of the
theft of the source code of one of its products.164 Microsoft was
one of “a number of companies [with] broad terms of service” that
allow for this action, though it is admittedly “rare that any
[company] actually follow[s] through and sift[s] through a
customer’s personal email.”165
This illustrates the problem with taking an external
perspective to determine whether email messages are
confidential—they simply are not. And yet, it can hardly be said
that this monitoring actually affects the attorney-client
relationship. From an external perspective, most electronic
communications are not truly private, but the user’s acceptance
of this type of monitoring would not seem to be inconsistent with
the user’s expectation of confidentiality and privilege. Consider
Professor Rice’s idea of safety over privacy: An internet user can
feel safe despite electronic monitoring because the user expects
that the monitoring has nothing to do with the subject of the
communication.166 Employer monitoring is, of course, more
invasive than the use of an automated system by Google to pick
which ads to display—it is the nature of the relationship between
the client and his employer that makes employer monitoring a
cause for concern. Rather than attempting to take an external
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perspective of the issue, courts should focus on privacy from the
perspective of the user because the user’s perspective is tied to
his relationship between himself and the party monitoring his
communications.
IV. TWO-FACTOR APPROACH
This Part proposes a new approach to handling the issue of
whether privilege can be applied when a client has used an
employer-monitored system to communicate with his attorney.
Current tests, such as the four-factor test, vary significantly
in their application by focusing too much on actual
confidentiality when true privacy is extremely hard to come by on
the Internet, and by focusing too much on employee manuals,
which are often left unread by employees. Variety in application
injects undue uncertainty into the privileged status of electronic
communications, which harms the attorney-client relationship.
In applying the current tests, courts are implicitly taking an
external perspective on the transaction, while ignoring the
nature of the parties that have access to the communication. The
difference between an employer as an email provider and other
parties that have access to a typical electronic communication
lies in the relationship between the user and the provider.
Taking an internal perspective, a user is aware of and chooses
the provider it wants to facilitate electronic communication—this
relationship between the user and the provider makes a right of
access relevant.
This Note proposes an approach that takes an internal
perspective of the communication, through the eyes of the user,
to determine whether the user’s subjective belief of
confidentiality was reasonable. This approach analyzes the
relationship between the user and the parties with qualified
access to monitor the communication. The analysis starts with a
presumption in favor of privilege—an internal perspective of an
email user’s experience suggests that an email, whether
facilitated by an employer or not, is a private communication,
like dropping a sealed letter in a mailbox. However, the nature
of the relationship between the email user and a party
facilitating the communication may overcome this presumption
of privilege. This analysis is undertaken in two parts. First, the
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court considers the relationship between the parties. Second, the
Court considers the nature of the right of access and how it is
actually enforced by the party with access.
At step one, the court considers the relationship between the
user and the facilitating party with qualified access. This
analysis should focus on the foreseeability of a message being
accessed for a purpose related to the subject matter of the
message.
For example, an employee who uses employermonitored email to communicate with his or her lawyer about a
lawsuit involving his or her employer would not have a strong
claim to privilege on that communication. This is because the
employee can expect his or her employer to have an interest in
monitoring employee communications related to itself.
Conversely, an employee using such a system to communicate
about a matter unrelated to the employer cannot foresee his or
her employer having any interest in monitoring that message
beyond monitoring in the ordinary course of business. This logic
applies to monitoring by any party. For example, Google’s
automated monitoring of email for advertising purposes is hardly
inconsistent with a client’s expectation that a communication will
remain confidential, or at least will not be revealed to a party
that may have a legal stake in the matter. Finally, a party, such
as the operator of an Internet router, is not at all relevant
because the party has little to no relationship with the user and
the user has no way of foreseeing this party’s presence. This
shift in focus from true confidentiality or right of access to
“safety,” motive to access, and foreseeability is necessary to
protect privacy interests because some party almost always has a
right of access to monitor Internet communications for some
purpose.
However, most parties that monitor Internet
communications do not do so with a purpose relating to the
subject matter of the underlying communication being monitored.
Therefore, clients do not, and should not, expect the monitoring
to impact such communications.
At step two, the court considers the nature of the right of
qualified access with a focus on how it is actually enforced. An
Internet Service Provider or Internet Mailbox Provider has a
relatively limited qualified right of access, circumscribed both by
privacy laws and by narrow terms of service agreements. An
employer has a more substantial right of access, circumscribed by
its employee monitoring policy. The exact wording of the
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employer’s policy deserves little attention, however, and the
analysis should be limited to whether it is broad enough to allow
for interception and inspection of the communication at issue.
However, the employee’s knowledge of the policy and the
employer’s application of that policy is far more important. If an
employer openly monitors communications on a regular basis,
and regularly informs its employees, this fact would weigh
against the application of privilege. Conversely, if an employer
reserves a right included in its employee handbook but never
exercises that right, it would be unfair to say that this alone can
prevent the application of privilege.
CONCLUSION
In the modern world, electronic communications are
essential, but third parties often facilitate them. These third
parties may have a qualified right of access to the
communications, such as permission to access them for business
purposes. Employers have among the broadest qualified rights to
access information stored on systems they provide to their
employees. Since courts will not apply privilege to prevent the
disclosure of nonconfidential communications, a framework for
handling cases in which a third party has a qualified right of
access for an electronic communication is needed—particularly in
the case of an employer which monitors its employees. In order
to inject certainty into privilege and to avoid reliance on the art
of drafting an employee handbook, courts should follow a twostepped approach. First, the court should consider the relation of
the parties; how foreseeable is it that the party with qualified
access—the employer—will become an adversary or will have
some interest in the matter discussed. Second, the court should
consider the nature of the qualified privilege; how broad is the
party’s—employer’s—right to monitor the communications, how
do they actually monitor the communications in practice, and
how do they interpret their own policy. With this approach, the
policy of the attorney-client privilege is upheld, and the situation
of a court unexpectedly refusing to apply the privilege can be
avoided.

